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The massive liquidation of inventories during the 2001 recession contrasts sharply with the
more moderate inventory movements observed in recent decades. While the rundown might
be seen as evidence that firms are not managing their inventories as effectively as some
economists have claimed, a careful analysis of inventory behavior in 2001 suggests that 
during much of the recession, firms were successfully regulating their inventories to avoid
a large buildup of excess stock.
Throughout the recession that began in March 2001,
U.S. firms sold off inventories at an extraordinarily
rapid pace. During the first three quarters of 2001,
inventories dropped by $120 billion.1 The liquidation 
then accelerated sharply, reaching a stunning rate of 
$114 billion in the fourth quarter alone. The sell-off of
inventories in this brief three-month period represented 
3.1 percent of goods sector output and was, by this mea-
sure, the largest in more than fifty years.
The rundown is all the more remarkable in that large
changes in inventories have become relatively rare in
recent decades. Quarterly changes exceeding 2 percent
of goods sector output occurred 43 percent of the time
during the 1953-83 period but only 24 percent of the
time since 1984.
The 2001 liquidation is difficult to square not only
with the smoother inventory behavior since 1984, but
also with the explanations of this behavior put forward
by a number of economists in recent years. These econo-
mists attribute the moderation in inventory movements
in the last two decades to firms’ improved ability to
manage their inventories. In this view, technological
advances have helped firms to anticipate changes in
demand and thus to avoid abrupt changes in production
and inventories. An important corollary to this argu-
ment is that better inventory management may have
lowered business cycle volatility by reducing the role
played by inventory swings.2
In this edition of Current Issues, we investigate the
apparent conflict between the huge inventory liquida-
tion of the 2001 recession and the inventory trends dis-
cerned by economists. Does the sharp rundown in
inventories mean that firms have not substantially
improved their control of inventories? And is the steep
plunge in the fourth quarter evidence that inventories
may continue to exacerbate business cycle fluctuations?
To resolve these questions, we undertake a detailed
comparison of the behavior of inventories in the 2001
recession and in previous recessions. Significantly, we
find that firms were, in fact, exercising better inventory
control in the first three quarters of 2001. Unlike busi-
nesses in recessions prior to 1984, firms anticipated the
slowdown in sales well before the recession began and
were shedding inventories from the outset in a calcu-
lated effort to avoid a heavy buildup of stocks. The
fourth-quarter liquidation, however, was in all likeli-
hood unintentional—the result of underestimating
future sales growth during a period of great uncertainty.
We also argue that the error in forecasting sales
growth in the fourth quarter has helped set the stage for
economic recovery, since the resulting shortfall in inven-
tories will require businesses to boost production
aggressively to replenish their stocks. A simulation exer-
cise suggests that even a partial correction in the supply
of inventories could add more than 1 percentage point to
GDP growth in 2002.
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Economists have long suggested that inventories ought
to play a “buffer stock” role, insulating production from
the volatility of sales. According to this notion, produc-
ers would refrain from adjusting output to match each
large shift in sales. Instead, they would use their invento-
ries to absorb sales fluctuations, allowing stocks to run
down during periods of strong sales and to accumulate
when sales were slow. By adopting this strategy, 
producers could maintain a relatively smooth stream 
of output—typically a more efficient mode of produc-
tion than making frequent changes to output.
In practice, however, producers have generally
chosen to move their inventories in the same direction as
sales. Indeed, evidence suggests that firms target a rela-
tively fixed ratio of inventory to sales, with the result
that a rise in sales causes firms to adjust their stocks
upward while a decline in sales prompts them to cut
back on their stocks. Since sales movements roughly
coincide with the phases of the business cycle, inventory
investment has proved to be strongly procyclical.
To understand more fully how inventory-to-sales 
(I-S) targets lead to procyclical inventory movements,
consider how firms respond to a sustained decline in
sales. If the decline is anticipated, firms may reduce
production ahead of time, but once sales actually drop,
the firms will still need to liquidate inventories if they
wish to stay close to their target I-S ratio. If the slow-
down is unanticipated, the required liquidation is even
larger, because the unexpectedly low sales will cause
inventories to accumulate quickly. Burdened with more
stock just when they would like to have less, firms will
need to divest themselves of this large inventory
buildup to return to their target ratio.
This example also makes clear how inventory move-
ments can intensify business cycle swings. Estimates
suggest that slowdowns in inventory investment on
average accounted for 24.5 percent, or roughly one-
quarter, of the overall slowdown in GDP growth during
postwar recessions (excluding the very brief 1980
recession). The latest recession is no exception: inven-
tory investment contributed 20 percent to the reduction
in GDP growth that began in the first quarter of 2001.
Although the basic relationship between inventory
investment and the business cycle has remained the
same throughout the postwar period, there is evidence
that improvements in inventory management beginning
in the early 1980s have altered the dynamics of this
relationship (see, for example, Kahn, McConnell, and
Perez-Quiros [2002]). First, inventory-to-sales ratios
have been trending downward since the early-to-mid
1980s, an indication that firms can meet their cus-
tomers’ needs with fewer stocks on hand (Chart 1).
Second, inventory investment now contributes less to
the quarter-to-quarter volatility of GDP growth. The
average contribution of inventory investment during
expansions in the 1953-83 period was 0.52 percentage
point, while the average for expansions in the 1983-
2001 period was only 0.10 percentage point. Finally, 
I-S ratios now stay closer to their apparent trend or 
“target” (Chart 1), suggesting that producers and retail-
ers may be making smaller forecasting mistakes.3
How could improved inventory management moder-
ate the procyclical inventory movements described
above? First, better information or forecasting tech-
niques might help firms to predict changes in demand
earlier and with much more accuracy. If firms had clear
signals of, say, an upcoming slowdown, they could then
reduce production to avert an unintended buildup of
inventories. As a result, they would not need to liquidate
vast amounts of stock to get inventories back on target
once the slowdown began. Second, lower target inven-
tory-to-sales ratios could diminish the response of
inventory investment to sales fluctuations. For example,
a firm seeking to maintain a low I-S ratio would not
need to liquidate as much inventory for a given decline
in sales as would a firm targeting a high ratio.
Changes in firm management of inventories may
account for the pattern of inventory behavior in the 
1990-91 recession, which differed markedly from that in 
earlier recessions. The inventory-to-sales ratio did not
rise spectacularly at the onset of the 1990-91 recession,
nor did it fall spectacularly at the beginning of the 
ensuing expansion. Better inventory control may have
allowed firms to avoid both an unwanted accumulation of 
inventories early in the downturn and the sharp cut in
inventories (and production) that typically occurs later. In
addition, it may have helped to keep the overall decline in
real output mild by historical standards, even allowing
for the fact that the downturn in sales was modest.
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.











ScaleBut while many signs suggest that inventory behavior
and its relationship to the business cycle have changed,
the latest recession seems to call these changes into
question. The huge liquidation of inventories in the
fourth quarter of 2001, following a substantial sell-off
of inventories in the first three quarters, recalls the
extreme inventory movements of recessions prior to
1984 and contrasts sharply with the more moderate
movements observed in the 1990-91 recession. Does
this mean that firms have not made as much progress 
in inventory management as some economists have
thought? Or that inventory control cannot be an impor-
tant source of the diminishing volatility of the business
cycle? To explore these questions, we now undertake a
more precise comparison of inventory behavior in the
2001 recession and previous recessions.
Inventory Behavior Past and Present
For our comparison, we set the 2001 recession against
an “average” or standardized recession that is represen-
tative of postwar recessions through 1983. This stan-
dardized recession is the contractionary phase of a larger
“reference cycle” (see the box). We compare inventory
behavior in the first three quarters of 2001 with inven-
tory behavior in the reference cycle, and then separately
discuss the huge liquidation that occurred in the fourth
quarter of 2001.
3
Although all recessions share certain features, they differ
in duration and magnitude. Here we draw on the work of
Burns and Mitchell (1946) to present a method of con-
structing a representative or average business cycle.
Following Burns and Mitchell's lead, we call this average
cycle a reference cycle.
The method involves placing data from all recessions on
the same horizontal scale, regardless of the recessions’
actual duration in real time. Data from a short recession
like the one in 1990-91 are stretched out, while those from
a longer recession like the one that began in 1973 are con-
densed, so that on a graph the two cycles appear to be of
equal length. A data series such as detrended final sales
can then be compared across different recessions, or aver-
aged over a group of recessions to obtain a representation
of the typical cyclical behavior of that series.  
The chart shows how a reference cycle is constructed
for peak-to-trough detrended GDP. The top panel shows
the series plotted in actual time for three different reces-
sions of varying lengths. The middle panel shows the
series scaled to the same length for each of the three
recessions, and the bottom panel shows the average of the
three re-scaled series.  The horizontal scale of the middle
and bottom panels is not demarcated in quarters, but in
fractions of a recession.  Thus, the typical behavior of this
series, as averaged across the three recessions, is to be
approximately 1 percent above trend at the peak, to fall to
about 1 percent below trend by the midpoint of the reces-
sion, and to trough at nearly 4 percent below trend.     
In our analysis, we will apply this method to data series
averaged over postwar recessions through 1983, the year
in which McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) find a break
in GDP volatility.  We then compare the behavior of the
same series during the 2001 recession with the historical
behavior represented by the averages.
Reference Cycles
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Peak and trough dates are as defined by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research.We find that the 2001 recession differs significantly
from earlier recessions in the timing of the inventory
liquidation (Chart 2, top panel). In the reference cycle,
inventory investment was generally positive and steady
for the first two quarters prior to the start of the down-
turn, and remained positive almost halfway through the
recession. In the case of the 2001 recession, however,
inventory investment slowed markedly prior to the start
of the downturn, and was actually negative in the first
quarter of the recession.
As a result of the early liquidation of inventories in
the 2001 recession, the behavior of the inventory-to-
sales ratio relative to its target also differed from its
past behavior (Chart 2, middle panel). In the earlier
recessions, as sales began to slow or decline, invento-
ries accumulated (presumably unintentionally). Conse-
quently, the inventory-to-sales ratio rose steadily in the
first part of the recession. Such an increase in the ratio
would exacerbate the economic slowdown because
eventually producers would need to cut production not
only to match slower sales, but also to liquidate these
excess inventories. 
In the 2001 recession, by contrast, the inventory-to-
sales ratio hovered remarkably close to target during the
first three quarters of 2001. The behavior of the ratio 
suggests that firms were anticipating the slowdown and
intentionally trimming inventories in order to avoid a
buildup and the resulting need for further production
cuts well into the recession. Thus, the I-S ratio never
really rose during the recession, with the result that even
larger production cuts to work off excess inventories
were not required.
The stark contrast in the behavior of the inventory-to-
sales ratio in the 2001 recession and the reference cycle
provides strong evidence that the latest downturn—at
least in the first three quarters—was not a return to an
earlier, less effective mode of inventory management.
Firms appear to have been very successful in managing
their inventories to avoid the sharp changes in produc-
tion that can contribute to output volatility.
Nevertheless, we still have to address the huge liqui-
dation in the fourth quarter of the 2001 recession. Is it 
possible to reconcile this development with the notion that
firms are doing a better job of controlling their inventories?
The Fourth-Quarter Puzzle
The $114 billion reduction in inventories in fourth-
quarter 2001 was one of the largest in history, whether
considered in dollar terms or as a percentage of output.
The inventory reductions were spread fairly evenly
across the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail trade
sectors of the economy, although the liquidation of
retail autos made a disproportionate contribution to the
overall reduction.
To clarify why there was such a dramatic rundown in
inventories in the fourth quarter, we return to our com-
parison of the 2001 recession and the reference cycle.
This time, we focus on the behavior of final sales in the
last quarter of the 2001 downturn relative to their behav-
ior at the end of the earlier recessions. Although sales 
followed the same steady decline in the first three quar-
ters of 2001 as they had in previous recessions, the fourth
quarter of 2001 saw an abrupt surge in sales that had no
parallel in pre-1984 recessions (Chart 2, bottom panel).
Sales moved about 1 percentage point closer to trend, a
gain equivalent to an 8 percent annualized rate of growth.
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
Note: The reference cycle represents a standardized business cycle, here 
calculated as an average of postwar cycles through 1983.
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This jump in sales growth explains much of the
fourth-quarter liquidation. It suggests that firms did not
make a calculated decision to sell off large quantities of
inventories but were instead caught off guard by a rise in
demand that drained inventories rapidly. Supporting this
interpretation is the fact that firms actually increased
production in the fourth quarter—an indication that they
had meant to end the quarter with replenished stocks.
Our estimate of the target I-S ratio implies that nearly
half, or $51 billion, of the $114 billion inventory liqui-
dation in the fourth quarter was unintended.
That firms were unprepared for a sharp increase in
demand is not surprising. As our reference cycle indi-
cates, past experience would have led producers to
expect the downturn in final sales to continue longer.
Moreover, the events of September 11 added consider-
able uncertainty to the business outlook and gave firms
reason to believe that future sales would be depressed.
Even in ordinary times, turning points in sales have
proved extremely difficult to predict. 
As a result of the mistaken sales forecast and the 
consequent drop in inventories, the inventory-to-sales
ratio fell far below its target (Chart 2, middle panel).
Nevertheless, the deviation from target—here termed
the inventory gap—was not unusually large by historical
standards. Gaps of this magnitude had occurred on
other occasions after the early 1980s, and the fourth-
quarter miss was clearly dwarfed by the deviations that
had occurred before 1984 (Chart 1).
What is unusual, however, is for the inventory-to-
sales ratio to fall below target during a recession. As we
showed above (Chart 2, middle panel), weakening
demand usually precipitates a buildup in inventories
that keeps firms above their target I-S ratios well into a
recession. Thus, the liquidation that typically takes
place at the onset of recovery helps businesses get their
swollen inventories down to more desirable levels. In
2001, however, the liquidation in the fourth quarter left
businesses with record-low inventory-to-sales ratios.
Implications for the Recovery
With even moderate growth in final sales, a below-target
inventory-to-sales ratio will fuel strong output growth in
the short run. The reason for this is that if firms are to
bring their inventories back up to target, they will need
to boost production considerably. Thus, although firms’
low I-S ratios stemmed largely from an error in forecast-
ing sales growth, that error may prove to be a source of
strength as the economy recovers.   
In order to assess the influence of inventory condi-
tions on the GDP outlook for 2002, we consider three
factors—the inventory gap as of fourth-quarter 2001, an
econometric estimate of the typical speed with which a
gap is closed, and an assumption about the path of final
sales growth in 2002.4 We combine this information in a
simulation to produce an estimate for GDP growth for
2002. We also produce a path for the inventory-to-sales
ratio and for the gap over this same time period.
We find that the inventory gap provides a strong stimu-
lus to output growth in the early part of 2002, resulting in
5.9 percent growth in the first quarter (see table).5 Growth
for 2002 as a whole is 4.6 percent. The inventory-to-sales
ratio, however, does not begin to move closer to its target
until the second half of 2002. The gap is then eliminated
gradually over the next one to two years. 
Although one to two years may seem a long horizon
for correcting an error made in a single quarter, it is not
really surprising. The gap, after all, is a direct conse-
quence of a shortfall of production relative to sales.
With such a running start for sales, it is difficult for
production even to catch up, much less surpass sales
and begin to reduce the gap. In the fourth quarter of
2001, the gap was 1.35 percent, reflecting the fact that
sales exceeded production in the goods sector by nearly
3 percent. Even with moderate sales growth at, say, 
a 2 percent annualized rate, goods sector output would
have to increase by 3.5 percent in one quarter (or at
roughly a 15 percent annual rate) just to keep the gap
from growing larger. Such a jump in production is
Quantifying the Impact of the Inventory Gap on GDP Growth
Baseline Scenario Counterfactual Scenario
Growth I-S Growth I-S
Sales GDP Ratioa Gapa Sales GDP Ratioa Gapa
2001:4 3.8 1.7 38.4 -1.3 -0.2 1.7 39.8 0
2002:1 2.6 5.9 37.9 -1.8 2.6 3.3 39.3 -0.4
2002:2 2.0 4.8 37.8 -1.7 2.0 3.1 39.1 -0.5
2002:3 2.8 4.3 37.9 -1.5 2.8 3.5 38.8 -0.6
2002:4 2.7 3.4 38.1 -1.1 2.7 3.3 38.7 -0.6
2002 2.5 4.6 2.5 3.3
Notes: The I-S gap is the difference between the actual and the targeted inventory-to-sales ratio. The shaded figures are drawn from actual data; the remaining figures
are simulated values.
aCalculated as a percentage of annual sales.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
unlikely. Indeed, the simulation shows the gap actually
growing to 1.8 percent in the second quarter, and
remaining above 1 percent at the end of 2002.6
To isolate the contribution of the gap to GDP growth,
we consider a counterfactual scenario in which sales in
the fourth quarter of 2001 are sufficiently lower to 
preclude an inventory gap, but then grow at the same
rate as in the previous simulation for 2002. We find that
without a gap in the fourth quarter of 2001, GDP
growth moderates substantially. For the first quarter 
of 2002, GDP growth is 3.3 percent, compared with 
5.9 percent in the baseline scenario; for the year, 
it is also 3.3 percent, compared with 4.6 percent in the 
baseline (see table). This exercise suggests that the
inventory shortfall could be a significant impetus to
output growth during the recovery.
Conclusion 
This article investigates whether the massive inventory
liquidation that took place during 2001 undermines the
view that businesses have improved their management
of inventories. Our conclusion is that better inventory
control was in fact evident through the first three 
quarters of 2001. We point to the fact that inventories
were liquidated in a more timely fashion than has been
typical in past business cycles, and that as a conse-
quence, firms avoided large unintended run-ups in their
inventory-to-sales ratios as well as the even larger liqui-
dation that such run-ups imply. 
We also conclude that the fourth-quarter liquidation
was probably unintended, a result of sales growing
faster than businesses had anticipated. We argue both
that the resulting inventory shortfall was not particu-
larly large by historical standards, and that a number of
extenuating circumstances probably contributed to it—
namely, the heightened uncertainty created by the
events of September 11 as well as the unusually short
duration of this recession.  
Finally, we assess what current inventory levels imply
for the recovery. Our simulation exercise suggests that
the inventory shortfall created by the liquidations of
2001 could trigger increased production and add more
than 1 percentage point to 2002 GDP growth.
Notes
1. Figures are in current dollars, at annual rates.
2. Alan Greenspan summed up this view in a 1999 speech: “The
dramatic changes in information technology that have enabled 
businesses to embrace the techniques of just-in-time inventory man-
agement appear to have reduced that part of the business cycle that
is attributable to inventory fluctuations” (“New Challenges for
Monetary Policy,” available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990827.htm>).
3. Although the smaller deviations from trend could simply reflect
a decline in sales volatility, Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros
(2002) provide evidence supporting the hypothesis of improved
inventory control. Our estimate of the target ratio is an HP filter of
the actual data, using a smoothing parameter of 32,000.
4. For this exercise, we use the average of two privately produced
forecasts of real final sales growth from the first quarter of 2002.
The first was provided to us by Edward Leamer of the Anderson
School at UCLA, and the second by Macroeconomic Advisors,
LLC.
5. As this article went to press, the report on GDP growth 
supported this prediction, with first-quarter GDP growth at an esti-
mated 5.6 percent annual rate. 
6. In moving from the goods sector to aggregate GDP, we also take
into account the fact that goods sector sales and output are typically
more cyclical than the rest of the economy.  So, for example, a fore-
cast of 2 percent aggregate final sales growth would correspond in
our model to 3 percent growth of goods sector sales and 1.4 percent
growth of sales in services and structures.
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